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Digital Ecclesia: Towards an Online Direct-Democracy
Framework
ABSTRACT
Citizens currently envision the transition to the online direct democ-
racy. However, the existing frameworks support the participatory
democracy. Inspired by the Athenians’ direct-democracy, we pro-
pose the initial version of the framework Digital-Ecclesia that offers
dynamic citizens’ engagement for achieving their universal partic-
ipation. Furthermore, the Digital Ecclesia makes fair decisions in
the case of conflicting votes by applying a game-theoretic method.
For achieving privacy and scalability in the decision-making, the
architecture of the Digital Ecclesia is distributed, i.e. each node is
modelled as an autonomous software-component. To evaluate the
fairness of the decision-making in the Digital Ecclesia, we conduct
experiments on a corpus of real-world citizens’ choices.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Citizens increasingly seek electronic ways to cooperate for resolving
their emerging issues, envisioning the transition from the traditional
representative democracy to the online direct democracy. Citizens’
attempts have recently led to the adoption of software frameworks
for online democracy by public organizations (e.g. open ministry in
Finland, participatory budgeting in Paris) [1].
Limitations & challenges. A framework supports the direct
democracy if it enables the universal and direct citizens’ participation
[2], as was happening in Ecclesia (the sovereign governing body)
of the Ancient Athenians’ democracy1 [3]. However, the existing
frameworks support the participatory democracy, since they are
used by citizens, who have previously asked their participation in
specific working-groups. These frameworks do not ensure that
relevant citizens are reached and prompted to engage (on-demand
engagement). Towards supporting the direct democracy, one of the
core challenges is the dynamic engagement of citizens.
However, the impact of the universal participation is that as the cit-
izens’ number increases, the diversity of their choices usually grow,
1It was the first time in the human history that the direct democracy was applied.
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leading to conflicts. Ecclesia was guaranteeing the fair decision-
making by compromising conflicting choices. On the contrary, the
current frameworks make decisions assuming that single consensus
(i.e. a single decision that represents the majority of citizens) can
always be reached, violating the impossibility theorem for social
decisions [4]. According to that theorem, single consensus on the
common will cannot be manufactured out of citizens’ choices. In
that case, we face the challenge of compromising conflicting choices
making fair decisions, i.e. they represent the majority of citizens.
Contribution. To address these challenges, we propose the
framework Digital Ecclesia, inspired by the Ancient Atheni-
ans’ democracy. The initial version of our framework offers dynamic
citizens’ engagement towards achieving universal and direct partici-
pation. To do so, the Digital Ecclesia is modelled as a social network
that offers high and dynamic reachability of citizens. In particular,
citizens are dynamically engaged via receiving notifications for new
working groups. Notifications are broadcasted in the network with
encrypted messages, starting from nodes that offer high reachabil-
ity of the network [5]. Since each network node notifies only its
neighbours, our broadcast is time and message efficient.
In the case of high participation, the Digital Ecclesia makes deci-
sions from a large number of citizens’ votes. For resolving privacy
and scalability issues in the decision-making, the architecture of the
Digital Ecclesia is distributed [6]. In particular, each node is an
autonomous software-component that has local storage (e.g. votes
are stored only locally) and executes in parallel the segments of the
decision-making procedure that are related to locally-stored infor-
mation. Thus, the Digital Ecclesia goes beyond the existing social-
networking frameworks, whose nodes are simple user-profiles.
To make fair decisions, the Digital Ecclesia compromises conflicts
by employing game-theoretic methods [7], which have not been
adopted by the existing frameworks. According to [8], a decision
compromises conflicting choices if it maximizes the Nash social-
welfare function, assuming that citizens vote independently to each
other and their choices are proportional to their preferences. To
realize independent voting, we model the voting procedure as a non-
cooperative game [9]. We further specify a distributed algorithm
for employing the voting game. To ensure that citizens’ votes are
proportional to their preferences, we finally propose a metric that
assesses the semantic similarity of past voting topics.
Concluding, the current version of the Digital Ecclesia offers
a distributed algorithm for supporting the two (communication &
engagement and decision-making) out of the five key-functions need
to be addressed in democracy frameworks [2]. To evaluate the
fairness of the decision-making in the Digital Ecclesia, we conduct
experiments on a corpus of real-world citizens’ choices.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formally
defines the notion of the voting game. Section 3 specifies our dis-
tributed framework. Section 4 presents the preliminary evaluation
of our algorithm. Section 5 describes related approaches. Section 6
summarizes our contribution and discusses its future directions.
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2 VOTING GAME
A game generally consists of a set of players (e.g. voters). Players
make choices with a pay-off that depends on their utility functions
[7]. We assume in the Digital Ecclesia voters provide a numerical
choice that belongs to a scale of discrete values (e.g. 5-star scale).
We further assume that the utility function of a voter is proportional
to his/her (probabilistic) voting preferences. The latter is calculated
based on voters’ past choices on similar voting topics. Overall, we
define below the notion of a voting game G for a topic p as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Voting game). A voting game is defined by the
tuple G = (T, N, R, U, W), such that:
• T = {t1, t2, . . . } is a finite set of textual terms for a topic p;
• N = {1, 2, . . . } is a finite set of voters2;
• R = {1, 2, . . . } is a finite set of numerical choices;
• Un (r ) = k ∗ prn (r ) is the utility function of a voter n for a
choice r and is proportional to his/her preferences prn with
respect to the choice r (k is the constant of proportionality);
• W (r ) = ∑Ni=1 logUi (r ) is the value of the social-welfare func-
tion for a choice r over the whole set of voters. 
Definition 2.2 (Voting preference). The preference prn of a voter
n on a choice r equals to the percentage of the times that s/he has
made the choice r for a set s of similar topics over the total number
of his/her all choices for these topics:
1. ∀r ∈ R, prn (r ) = vn (r ,s )vn (s ) ∈ [0, 1],
a. vn (r, s ) is the number of times that a voter n has made
a choice r for a set s of similar topics;
b. vn (s ) is the total number of the choices that s/he has
made for a set s of similar topics;
c. s = {p1, p2, . . . , p |s | } : ∀pi ∈ s, sim(p, pi ) > θ | θ ∈
[0, 1], is the set of the past topics pi whose similarities
to the current topic p are greater than a threshold θ ;
d. sim(pi , pj ) =
|T1 |∑
k=1
simt (tk , f (tk ))
|T1 | , tk ∈ T1 ∧ f (tk ) ∈ T2 ∧
|T1 | ≤ |T2 | is the semantic similarity among the terms
T1 and T2 of two topics pi and pj :
i. f : tk → tm |
|T1 |∑
k=1
simt (tk , f (tk )) is max;
ii. simt (tk , tm ) = simLin (tk , tm ).
2. ∑Rmaxi=1 prn (ri ) = 1, the sum of the rating probabilities of a
consumer in the rating space R equals to 1. 
Concerning the metric sim(pi , pj ), it calculates the similarity be-
tween two topics as the average of the similarities of their most
similar pairs of terms. To do so, the metric solves the assignment
problem f of the maximum-weighted matching in a bipartite graph
[10], where the nodes correspond to terms and the edges to their simi-
larities. Regarding the metric simt (tk , tm ), it assesses the relatedness
of terms by calculating the Lin’s similarity of the corresponding
ontology concepts in WordNet [11].
3 DISTRIBUTED FRAMEWORK
As previously discussed, the Digital Ecclesia is modelled as a bidi-
rectional network of software components that communicate to each
other by passing encrypted messages. Each component corresponds
2The framework assigns to each voter a unique identifier after his/her registration.
to a single citizen, who holds authentication credentials. The topol-
ogy of the network (a.k.a. communication links) can be dynamically
updated during its lifetime3. We call neighbours the nodes connected
with a direct communication-link.
To offer dynamic engagement and distributed voting game, the
Digital Ecclesia includes the distributed algorithm in Section 3.1,
whose time and message complexity are discussed in Section 3.2.
3.1 Distributed Algorithm
Our algorithm (Alg. 1) is triggered by a node (hereafter called
source) that corresponds to one of the citizens who initiated a new
working group. The algorithm continues to the voting procedure
only if the source offers high reachability of the network. To cope
with the dynamicity of the network (e.g. communication links may
have been updated), the reachability of the source is dynamically
calculated, as explained in the following.
The algorithm consists of a local program for each node that
provides the ability to nodes to perform local computations and
send/receive messages. Since nodes do not usually have the same
computation clock, messages are sent asynchronously4. Nodes may
send/receive the messages, < r each >, < parent >, < source >,
< vote >, and < util ity > (Alg. 1 (1, 9, 11, 17, and 32)).
Reach message. A reach message is initially sent by the source
node to all its neighbours (Alg. 1 (2-4)). Every node that receives the
message sets its parent node, sends parent and source messages (see
below), and forwards the reach message to its neighbours except its
parent (Alg. 1 (6-8)). Thus, a reach message is gradually forwarded
(neighbour-by-neighbour) to all the nodes that are reachable from
the source node (broadcast in message-passing systems [12]). To
broadcast a reach message in a controlled way (i.e. messages do not
wander in the network via different paths), a node does not forward
messages that have already received (Alg. 1 (5)).
Source and parent messages. Since every node maintains its
parent and children (distributed fashion), the algorithm constructs
a minimum spanning-tree [13] (rooted at the source node) of the
network part that is reachable from the source node. Moreover,
every source-message is gradually forwarded back to the source
node (Alg. 1 (16)) – convergecast in message-passing systems [12].
By receipt of source message, the source node increases the number
of the received messages (Alg. 1 (13)). If the number is greater
than a threshold ω, then the source node has high reachability5 and
sends vote messages to its children (Alg. 1 (14-15)). Note that the
source node does not send vote messages until the time limit has
been expired in order to avoid to send them multiple times.
Vote message. When a node receives a vote message, then the
node forwards the message to its children (Alg. 1 (18)). Following,
the node asks by the citizen to vote for the current topic (Alg. 1
(21)), provided his/her credentials (Alg. 1 (19)). If the authentication
is not successful, then the execution of the node for this topic is
stopped (Alg. 1 (20)). Otherwise, the current vote of the citizen
is locally stored, meeting our privacy requirement (Alg. 1 (29)).
Following, the node updates the voting preferences of the citizen
(Alg. 1 (23-28)) – applying Def. 2.2) – and sends the set of its
3We leave as future work the topology management of the Digital Ecclesia.
4For practical reasons, we considered in the implementation of the Digital Ecclesia
upper bounds on voting time and message delays.
5In the implementation of the Digital Ecclesia, we used the threshold value 0.6.
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Algorithm 1 Dynamic Engagement & Distributed Voting Game
// Code for node ni , 1 ≤ i ≤ M (the total number of network nodes).
Input: nr , θ , ω
1: upon receiving < r each, p, R > from neighbour nj do
2: if ni = nr then // It corresponds to the source node.
3: parent ← ni
4: SEND < r each, p, R > to all neighbours
5: else if parent = null then
6: parent ← nj
7: SEND < parent > and < source > to parent
8: SEND < r each, p, R > to all neighbours except nj
9: upon receiving < parent > from neighbour nj do
10: children ← children ∪ {nj }
11: upon receiving < source > do
12: if ni = nr then
13: ++r eached
14: if r eached > ω and expired = true then
15: SEND < vote (p, R, θ ) > to children
16: else SEND < source > to parent
17: upon receiving < vote (p, R, θ ) > do
18: SEND < vote (p, R, θ ) > to children
19: correct ← AUTHENTICATE
20: if correct = false then RETURN end if
21: r ← VOTE(p, R, θ )
22: STORE(p, r )
23: for all pi ∈ (Rn − {p }) do
24: if SIM(p, pi ) > θ then
25: s ← s ∪ {pi }
26: ++vn (s )
27: if r = Rn (pi ) then ++vn (r, s )
28: prn (r )← vn (r ,s )vn (s )
29: STORE(prn (r ))
30: < util ity(prn ) >← ENCRYPT(prn )
31: SEND < util ity(prn ) > to parent
32: upon receiving < util ity(prn ) > from node n do
33: if ni = nr then
34: prn ← DECRYPT(< util ity(prn ) >)
35: util it ies .ADD(prn )
36: if expired = true or |util it ies |= r eached then
37: for all r ∈ R do
38: W (r )← ∑|util it ies |i=1 logUi (r )
39: ifW (r ) > max then
40: max ←W (r )
41: rmax ← r
42: else SEND < util ity(prn ) > to parent
updated utility-values to its parent (Alg. 1 (31)). For privacy reasons,
the utility values have been firstly encrypted (Alg. 1 (30)) by using
the asymmetrical-cryptography technique [14].
Utility message. A node that has received a utility message for-
wards the message to its parent. All the utility-values are gradually
collected to the source node (convergecast). The source node de-
crypts each received utility-message (Alg. 1 (34)) and maintains the
utility values (Alg. 1 (35)). Before making a decision, the source
node waits until a time limit has expired or all the reachable nodes
Table 1: Statistics for the reported categories of products.
ID Category #consumers #products
A1 Beauty 1210271 249274
A2 Tools & Home Improvement 1212468 260659
A3 Video Games 826767 50210
A4 Toys & Games 1342911 327698
A5 Health & Personal Care 1851132 252331
have sent utility messages (Alg. 1 (36)). Finally, the source node
makes a decision that maximizes the social-welfare function (Alg. 1
(37-41)) – applying Def. 2.1.
3.2 Time and Message Complexity & Scalability
In the broadcast of reach messages, the time complexity is O(2 ∗
N ), since all the nodes receive a reach message at most twice. The
message complexity is N , since every node sends its own reach
message. In the convergecast of source messages, since all the
nodes send their source messages to their parents based on a known
spinning-tree, the time complexity is logN , where logN is the depth
of the tree. The message complexity is N , since every node sends
its own source message. In the broadcast of vote messages, the time
and message complexity are N , since all the nodes receive a vote
message exactly once. In the convergecast of utility messages, the
time complexity is logN and the message complexity is N . The
overall (time and message) complexity of the algorithm, O(7N +
2logN ) = O(N ), asymptotically scales in a linear way to the total
number N of the nodes that are reachable from the source node.
4 PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
Dataset. To evaluate our algorithm on large-scale real-world votes,
we used the publicly available6 Amazon numerical ratings on thou-
sands of products [15]. We considered that each product corresponds
to a voting topic and a rating corresponds to a vote. The products
had been organized into high-level categories. Each category con-
tains products that may be similar to each other in terms of their
descriptive terms. Due to lack of space, we indicatively present the
results for five middle-sized categories7 (Table 1).
Evaluation methodology. We implemented a graph simulation
of a distributed network and executed our algorithm for each product
of the reported categories. At each execution, we configured the
network to contain all the consumers who rated an examined product.
We also considered a topology of the network such that all the nodes
are reachable from at least one source node. To evaluate the fairness
of decisions, we present the results for products that have conflicting
ratings, i.e. there is no rating for a product that represents the
majority of consumers. We compared the fairness of the decisions
made by our algorithm against the arithmetic mean and median of
ratings. These aggregators are the most widely used for making
decisions on consumers’ choices [16]. We assume that a decision is
fair if it represents at least the 60% of the consumers’ preferences
(i.e. minimum percentage for majority decisions8).
6jmcauley.ucsd.edu/data/amazon
7We have reached to analogous conclusions for the remaining categories.
8https://www.princeton.edu/∼pcwcr/drafting/voting.html
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Figure 1: Products with conflicting ratings and fair decisions.
Evaluation results. Fig. 1 depicts for each category the percent-
ages of the products with both conflicting ratings and fair decisions.
We observe that the percentages of the fair decisions made by our
algorithm range from the 76% to the 81% of products. On the con-
trary, the corresponding percentages for the arithmetic mean (resp.
median) range from the 33% (resp. 30%) to the 46% (resp. 40%) of
products. These percentages further show that the decisions made by
our algorithm are not the same with arithmetic means and medians
in at least the 30% of products (esp. from the 30% to the 41% of
products). Concluding, our algorithm makes fair decisions in a high
number of cases and is more effective than the typical aggregators.
5 RELATED WORK
From architecture perspective, we organize the existing frameworks
for online participatory democracy in three generations: (i) cen-
tralized Web-based frameworks (e.g. [17]), (ii) cloud-based frame-
works (e.g. Open Town Hall9), and service-oriented frameworks
(e.g. [2, 18, 19]). Among the five key-functions [2], the existing
frameworks have primarily focused on proposal making & voting
(e.g. Agora Voting10), online collaboration & discussion (e.g.
Etherpad11), and social communication [19].
Towards supporting the direct democracy, we faced the challenges
of the dynamic engagement of citizens and distributed voting. Re-
garding these challenges, the existing frameworks model citizens
by simple user-profiles, without ensuring that relevant citizens are
reached (on-demand engagement). Moreover, citizens’ data are
stored on the server side, raising security and privacy issues. We fur-
ther faced the challenge of conflicts that emerge in a large number of
citizens’ votes. Concerning this challenge, the existing frameworks
make single-consensus decisions, assuming there are decisions that
can represent the majority of votes. Single-consensus decision-
making models that have been mainly used are decision trees [20]
and Bayesian networks [21].
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
To support the direct democracy, we proposed the distributed frame-
work Digital-Ecclesia that offers dynamic citizens’ engagement and
distributed game-theoretic decisions. We evaluated our framework
9http://opentownhall.com
10http://agoravoting.org
11http://etherpad.org
on a corpus of real-world choices and the preliminary results showed
that our algorithm makes fair decisions in a high number of cases.
A future research-direction is to extend our distributed algorithm
with sophisticated security and privacy techniques. On top of this,
the voting procedure could be modelled as a cooperative game that
gives incentives and rewards to citizens in order to make better
choices. A final direction is to extend our framework to support the
remaining key-functions of online democracy-frameworks.
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